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INCREASING STATE RESTRICTIONS ON RUSSIAN PROTESTANT
SEMINARIES

By Mark R. Elliott

Mark R. Elliott, retired professor of history, earned a B.A. from Asbury University and an M.A.
and Ph.D. from the University of Kentucky. He taught at Asbury University, Wilmore, Kentucky;
Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois; Samford University, Birmingham, Alabama; and Southern
Wesleyan University, Central, South Carolina. At Wheaton College Dr. Elliott served for 13 years
as director of the Institute for East-West Christian Studies, and at Samford University he served
for six years as director of the Global Center at Beeson Divinity School. He served as editor of the
East-West Church and Ministry Report (www.eastwestreport.org) from its founding in 1993
through 2017. He now serves as editor emeritus. He is also an Advisory Editor of OPREE.
Introduction
Ivan Smirnov, I will call him, is originally from one of the western republics of the former
Soviet Union, but presently studies in a provincial Russian Protestant seminary that authorities
have attempted to close. Ivan believes it is providential his training has been able to continue: “Our
God in His infinite grace has allowed our school to go on as an institution of higher education.”
So far, courts have ruled three times that the Russian Ministry of Education and Science “did not
have any credible evidence which would give warrant to the state to shut us down.” At one point
the seminary’s license was revoked but later reinstated, for which Ivan is thankful: “Praise the
Lord for His mercy and protection!”
This young seminarian comes from a believing family: “My grandmother was threatened
with drowning for her faith back in the early days of Communism.” Later, “my father was not
allowed to continue studies” even though he was an excellent student. Ivan relates he “chose to
follow Christ at the age of 15,” and since the end of Communist Party rule he has had the
opportunity to openly serve in his church and pursue a theological education. He considers his life
busy but blessed: “I am currently serving in the counseling ministry in my local church as well as
preach and lead a small group.” In seminary he has specialized in the study of the Old Testament
and Hebrew, “so naturally the OT books of the Bible have had an impact on me.”
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Ivan is aware of growing outside pressures on his church and his seminary: “There are
some challenges from authorities in the life of the evangelical congregations…connected to
the…[2016] anti-missionary [Yarovaya] law which has restricted the work of missionaries outside
of the church premises.” As for his seminary, to date the difficulties have been felt “mostly in the
Academic Dean’s office.” Students carry on with their studies, although interspersed with periodic
“updates about the current status of the legal process…. The vast majority of…students come
motivated to gain proficiency and get equipped in a particular area of ministry. The question of a
diploma (accreditation, licensure, etc.) is secondary.”1 Increasing state pressures upon Protestant
seminaries to which “Ivan Smirnov” refers, is the subject of the present paper.

Summary of Statutes Affecting Protestant Seminaries
Russian Federation statutes applicable to the country’s Protestant seminaries are of two
types: 1) broad-stroke legislation that regulates church-state relations and non-governme nta l
organizations (NGOs), and 2) laws regulating higher (tertiary) education. The first category
includes the 1990 Law “On Freedom of Conscience,” whose generous provisions were radically
eviscerated in 1997 and 2016 legislation,2 and the 2012 NGO Foreign Agent Law. 3 The second
category includes a 1992 statute legalizing private higher education, 4 a 2004 presidential decree
establishing the Federal Service for Supervision of Education and Science (Rosobrnadzor);5 a 2008
law “On Changes…Concerning Licensing and Accreditation of Professional Religious Schools,” 6
and a 2012 Federal Law “On Education.”7
Notes:
1 “Ivan Smirnov,” emails to author, 9 and 12 January 2020.
2 Elizaveta Potapova and Stefan Trines, “Education in the Russian Federation,” World Education News + Reviews, 6
June 2017; https://wenr.wes.org/2017/06/education-in-the-russian-federation.
3 “Russia: Four Years of Putin’s Foreign Agents’ Law to Shackle and Silence NGOs,” Amn esty International, 18
November 2016; https:www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/russia-four-years-of-putins-foreign-agents-law-toshackle-and-silence-ngos/.
4 Dmitry A. Suspitsin, “Between the State and the Market: Sources of Sponsorship and Legitimacy in Russian Nonstate
Higher Education” in Private Higher Education in Post-Communist Europe: In Search of Legitimacy. ed. by Snejana
Slantcheva and Daniel C. Levy (London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2017), 157 and 160-61.
5 Decree No. 314, 9 March 2004, “On the System and Structure of Federal Executive Authorities;”
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/rus_e/WTACCRUS50_LEG_1.pdf. See also Konstantin Petrenko and Perry L.
Glanzer, “The Recent Emergence of Private Christian Colleges and Universities in Russia: Historical Reasons and
Contemporary Developments,” Christian Higher Education 4 (2005), 95.
6 “Putin Signs into Law a Bill on State Accreditation of Religious Schools,” Interfax, 29 February 2008.
7 No. 273-FZ. See Sergey Chervonenko, “Proverka ot Rosobrnadzora: itogi i mysli [Verification from Rosobrnadzor;
Results and Thoughts], 23 August 2019; medium.com@chervonenko/proverka-ot-rosobrnadzora-itogi-i-my s lib340a766ffc7;
Potopova
and
Trines,
“Education,”
8;
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail%3Fp_lang%Den26p_isn%3D93529.
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Church-State and NGO Legislation
As regards church-state legislation, the 1990 Law On Freedom of Conscience made
provision for religious expression to an extent never before realized in Russian history and rarely
achieved by any state worldwide.8 In the law’s wake Russian Protestants, whose last Bible school
Soviet authorities had closed in 1929, energetically, even frantically, launched numerous pastoral
training programs with the help of coreligionists from abroad. 9 The number increased from a
handful in 1992 to 71 in 1999. (For the entire former Soviet Union the number of Protestant
theological institutions increased from approximately 40 in 1992 to 137 in 1999.) 10
1997 Duma legislation “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations Act,”
signed by President Boris Yeltsin, reversed the trend, introducing major impediments to the free
exercise of religion.11 However, two factors temporarily ameliorated some of the harshest
restrictions imposed by this statute. First, uneven and sometimes haphazard enforcement was the
rule in a state in which arbitrary administrative practice has always counted for more than the letter
of the law. Second, Russia’s Constitutional Court nullified some of the law’s most repressive
provisions.12
In contrast, 2016 legislation “On Combatting Terrorism” (No. 374-FZ), popularly known
as the Yarovaya Law after the Duma deputy who introduced the bill, more aggressively infringes
upon the rights of non-Orthodox religious adherents. Styled as an anti-terrorist measure, it in
reality significantly curtails foreign and domestic missionary efforts very broadly defined and
sharply undermines freedom of assembly and speech for all of Russia’s non-Orthodox believers.
President Vladimir Putin’s much greater control over Russian courts, compared to Yeltsin, has

Mark Elliott, “New Opportunities, New Demands in the Old Red Empire,” Evangelical Missions Quarterly 28
(January 1992): 32-39.
9 Mark Elliott, “Protestant Theological Education in the Former Soviet Union,” International Bulletin of Missionary
Research 18 (January 1994): 14.
10 Spravochnik bogoslovskie uchebnye zavedeniya v stranakh SNG i Baltii (Moscow: Assotsiatsiya “Dukhovnoe
Vozrozhdenie,” 199). See also Hunter Baker, “Russian Seminaries’ Enrollment Woes,” Christianity Today online, 8
November 2007.
11
https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/russsia/2941574/on-freedom-of-conscience-and-relig ious association-act.html.
12 Mark Elliott, “New Restrictive Law on Religion in Russia,” East-West Church and Ministry Report 5 (Summer
1997): 1-2; Lauren Homer, “Human Rights Lawyer Criticizes New Russian Religion Law,” East-West Church and
Ministry Report 5 (Summer 1997): 2-3; “Commentary on the New Russian Law on Religion,” East-West Church and
Ministry Report 5 (Summer 1997): 3-5; Mark Elliott, “The New Russian Law on Religion: What Is the Fallout for
Evangelicals?” East-West Church and Ministry Report 5 (Fall 1997): 4-5.
8
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also added teeth to Yarovaya restrictions upon minority faiths. In such a climate, Protestant
seminaries were bound to suffer. According to one American respondent who previously taught in
a Protestant seminary, the 2016 Yarovaya legislation had an immediate chilling effect upon
widespread utilization of U.S. faculty in theological programs. Returning to Russia in early 2017,
this individual was interrogated by an FSB agent for over an hour, one line of questioning centering
on why Americans were needed as seminary instructors. 13
Lastly, on the macro level, 2012 NGO legislation amounted to a fundamental assault on
Russian civil society. Not surprisingly, branding private entities that receive financial support from
abroad with the pejorative label of “foreign agent” led to the closure or reduced effectiveness of
many Russian NGOs.14 Religious bodies, including Protestant seminaries, which to this day
receive Western and South Korean financial assistance, are exempt from the “foreign agent”
moniker. Nevertheless, state-controlled media have crafted a hostile public perception of these
pastoral training programs based in part on their ties abroad. As a result, they live in fear that their
official status might yet be tarnished with the “foreign agent” brush.

Higher Education Legislation
A review of educational legislation affecting Protestant seminaries begins with the Duma’s
legalization of private higher education in 1992. 15 The number of such institutions subsequently
increased in just over a decade from 78 in 1993-94 to 409 in 2004-05, while private higher
education enrollment increased in the same years from 70,000 to over one million, or roughly 15
percent of total tertiary enrollment. 16

Maria Kravchenko, “Inventing Extremists: The Impact of Russian Anti-Extremism Policies on Freedom of Religion
or Belief,”
United States Commission
on International Religious
Freedom, January 2018;
https://www.uscirf.gov/reports -briefs/special-reports/inventing-extremists-the-impact-russian-anti-extremismpolicies; Alexei Markevich, “Mission of Russian Christian Education,” E. Stanley Jones School of World Missions
and Evangelism, Asbury Theological Seminary, 6 May 2019; Anonymous, email to aut hor, 10 February 2020.
14 Katherin Machalek, “Factsheet: Russia’s NGO Laws,” Freedom House, [2013]; https://freedomhouse.org.
15 Potapova and Trines, “Education;” and Daria Platonova and Dmitry Semyonov, “Russia: The Institutional
Landscape of Russian Higher Education” in 25 Years of Transformations of Higher Education Systems in Post -Soviet
Countries (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978 -3-319-52980-6-13; p. 345.
16 Dmitry A Suspitsin, “Private Higher Education in Russia: Th e Quest for Legitimacy,” Ph.D. dissertation,
Pennsylvania State University, 2007; Suspitsyn, “Between the State and the Market,” 160-61; Anthony W. Morgan
and Nadezhda V. Kulikova, “Reform and Adaptation in Russian Higher Education, An Institutional Perspe ctive,”
European Education 39 (Fall 2007): 42; Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 15; and Platonova and Semyonov,
“Russia,” 345.
13
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For a host of reasons the state came to view this growth of private institutions as
uncontrolled and problematic, as it also deemed the increase in the total number of higher
educational programs, private and public, to 1,071 by 2007. 17 State responses have included the
presidential decree of 2004 and legislation in 2008 and 2012 previously noted. Rosobrnadzor, the
federal higher education regulatory agency established in 2004, found its authority greatly
enhanced by means of the 2008 and 2012 statutes. Konstantin Petrenko and Perry Glanzer (Baylor
University) note that “The centralized nature of Russian higher education and the influence that
the Ministry of Education exerts over a school’s curriculum would be surprising to anyone in the
West.”18
With Putin publicly mandating improved quality and increased competitiveness in higher
education, Rosobrnadzor was charged with responsibility for close scrutiny of the performance of
all post-secondary institutions.19 By the 2015-16 school year the number of universities and
institutes stood at 896, down 175 in a decade. 20 In 2014-17 alone Rosobrnadzor revoked 58
educational licenses, terminated the accreditation of 125 institutions, and ordered a halt to
admissions in an additional 68 universities. Seventy of these programs reopened after correcting
Rosobrnadzor citations, but the trajectory of tightened, potentially lethal oversight was clear.21 In
2015 Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanov referred to the process as a “clean- up”
of higher education. His goal was a 40 percent reduction in the number of public universities and
an 80 percent reduction in their branch campuses. 22 The outcome has been the state’s ongoing
merger of “inefficient” universities and the closure, to date, of roughly half of all branch
campuses.23
Livanov also specifically targeted non-public institutions: “We want to reduce private
universities which provide low quality education.”24 Even before Livanov’s tenure, his predecessor
as Minister of Education and Science, Andrei Fursenko (2004-12), had publicly stated a goal of “a

Morgan and Kulikova, “Reform,” 57; and Suspitsyn, “Private Higher Education,” 1.
Petrenko and Glanzer, “The Recent Emergence,” 92.
19 Andrei Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” Social Research 76 (Spring 2009): 215-16. For the Rosobrdnadzor
website see obrnadzor.gov.ru/ru/.
20 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 15.
21 “Russia’s Higher Education Institutions are Disappearing,” khodorkovsky.com/russias -higher-educationinstitutions-disappearing.
22 “Russia’s Higher Education.”
23 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 5.
24 “Russia’s Higher Education.” See also Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 4.
17
18
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maximum 50 universities and 150 to 200 institutes of higher education.”25 Rector Gennadi
Pshenichny of Kuban Evangelical Christian University deems a 2015 Rosobrnadzor “audit” of
non-state schools as “in reality…a state-sanctioned lever to decrease the number of private
institutions of higher learning and funnel the students into state-sponsored/state sanctioned
schools.”26

Factors Behind Increasing Oversight: Quality Control
In analyzing factors behind increasing state oversight of post-secondary education
commentators frequently cite the need for greater quality control. This explanation is the case not
only with Putin and the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, but even with some Protestant
theological educators. Aleksandr Spichak, academic dean of the Protestant Trinity Video Seminary
in Kursk, writes, “Many secular universities are closed down…because many of them were just
selling diplomas, and the government does want to improve the quality of higher education and
get rid of fake institutions.”27 Sergey Chervonenko, administrator at the interdenominationa l
Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary, notes, “In the period of the 90s, there was no order in
the country….There was no regulation of educational activities, so a great many educational
institutions appeared that were distributing diplomas.”28
The early post-Soviet period was indeed rife with for-profit as well as nonprofit programs
of uneven quality, popularly characterized as “diploma mills.”29 Professor Olga Zaprometova,
holder of two earned doctorates and former dean of the Pentecostal Eurasian Theologica l
Seminary, has taught and currently teaches biblical studies at a number of Moscow’s Protestant
and Orthodox seminaries. Her opinion is that “the Lord is using these [Rosobrnadzor] visits to
improve the educational level of Protestant seminaries.” She adds that professors need to teach
only in their fields of expertise, that faculty need to be engaged in professional growth and
development, that administrators need assistance in honing their competencies, and that future
pastors need instruction in proper command of the Russian language. When asked if increasing

“Russian Education Minister Calls for Pruning Vast State Higher-Education System,” Chronicle of Higher
Education, 25 July 2008.
26 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019.
27 Aleksandr Spichak, email to author, 11 December 2019.
28 Sergey Chervonenko, email to author, 23 August 2019.
29 John A. Bernbaum, Opening the Red Door; The Inside Story of Russia’s First Christian Liberal Arts University
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2019), 190.
25
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state oversight of higher education, including Protestant seminaries, was part of an overall
government strategy to bring all sectors of Russian society under closer supervision, Zaprometova
responded,
I am not so sure about it, but it is a wise strategy, because there is no supervision of the
Christian schools by church officials (board members, etc.), plus quite often board
members are not qualified enough for this ministry, they do not have higher education or
got it recently, even online or from the same Christian school, there are almost no Ph.D.s
among church supervisors, and without supervision, especially in the academy, the quality
of Christian education is drastically going down!30
Factors Behind Increasing Oversight: Demographics
In addition to improved quality as a motivation for audits, other factors appear to be at play
behind Rosobrnadzor’s strict accounting of higher education in general and Protestant seminar ies
in particular. First, demographics come to bear on the issue.31 A 2005 estimate projected a Russian
population decline from 144.1 million in 2004 to 50 to 100 million by 2050. 32 As this populatio n
shortfall relates to education, between 2000/01 and 2014/15 the number of secondary school
graduates fell from 1.46 million to 701,400, with a resulting drop in tertiary enrollment from 7.5
million to 4.2 million students between 2008/09 and 2014/15. 33 The projected decrease in higher
education enrollments— “by as much as 56 percent between 2008 and 2021”—undoubted ly
contributes to state measures to reduce the number of institutions—and associated costs—of higher
education.34 Thus, cuts in tertiary education expenditures and school mergers and closures stem in
part from budgetary pressures. Educational funding has also been compromised by falling tax
revenues due to declining oil and gas prices and Western sanctions triggered by Russian
annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in eastern Ukraine. 35
One consequence of Russia’s demographic decline is heightened competition for higher
education enrollment and lobbying by public institutions to reduce competition from their private

30

Olga Zaprometova, email to author, 9 October 2019.
A. Geroimenko, Grigori A. Kliucharev, and W. John Morgan, “Private Higher Education in Russia:
Capacity for Innovation and Investment,” European Journal of Education; Research, Development and Policy 47 (No.
1, 2012); https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-3425.2011.01509.x; Perry L. Glanzer and Konstantin Petrenko, “Private
Christian Colleges and Universities in the Former Soviet Union,” East-West Church and Ministry Report 14 (Spring
2006): 11; and Petrenko and Glanzer, “Recent Emergence,” 93.
32 Morgan and Kulikova, “Reform,” 55. See also “Russia’s Natural Population Decline to Hit 11-Year Record in
2019,” Moscow Times, 13 December 2019.
33 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 4. See also Kortunov. “Russian Higher Education,” 214.
34 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 3. See also Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 213.
35 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 2-4. See also Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 208.
31 Vladimir
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counterparts.36 And as noted, the state has obliged by making life more difficult for non-public
universities and institutes.

Factors Behind Increasing Oversight: The Predictable Goal of an Authoritarian State
In 2019-20 Protestant educators and leaders gave responses to the following survey
question:
Is increasing Russian state oversight of private educational institutions, includ ing
Protestant seminaries, a justifiable effort to standardize higher education and ensure quality
[or] part of an overall government strategy to bring all sectors of Russian society under
closer state supervision?37
Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary’s Sergey Chervonenko answered, “Rosobrnadzor
checks, in my humble opinion, are part of a program aimed at strengthening control over
education.” Yet he views this oversight positively because thereby “Religious universities have
the opportunity to stand on a par with state universities.”38 The leader of one Protestant
denomination related a “tough but successful” Rosobrnadzor inspection of his church’s seminary,
but did not consider it to be discrimination against non-Orthodox. Rather, he viewed it as part of
the “overall trend in all sectors of society to have more [state] control.”39 Similarly, but less
positively, Roman Lunkin, a scholar of religion in the Russian Academy of Sciences, contends,
“The Russian state’s policy on religious education has become a mirror image of its sweeping
control over all social initiatives and non-governmental organizations.”40
Several personal observations are in order. First, it bears noting that authoritarianism has
been a characteristic of the Russian state for centuries—under tsars, commissars, and now Putin.
As regards Russian higher education today, sources are uniform in recognizing growing state
involvement. Judging whether or not this increased oversight is for good or ill is where
disagreements occur. Certainly, quality control has its place. However, augmented control does
not necessarily guarantee quality. To the contrary, as coming case studies will attest, rigorous

Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 208 and 216; Morgan and Ku likova, “Reform,” 56.
Mark R. Elliott, emails to Russian Protestant educators and leaders, 8 and 29 October 2019; 4 and 8 December 2019;
9 February 2020.
38 Sergey Chervonenko, email to author, 23 August 2019.
39 Anonymous, email to author, 25 October 2019.
40 Roman Lunkin, “Theology for a Select Few: Soviet Déja Vu for Russia’s Protestants?” East-West Church Review
27 (No. 3, 2019): 11.
36
37
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oversight can actually undermine quality through personal bias, arbitrariness, and corruption,
faults greater controls ironically are meant to reduce.
One consequence of increasing supervision of higher education that the state, no doubt,
finds especially useful is the greater ease it affords it in controlling the tertiary sector. Authorita r ia n
rule in Russia has a longstanding penchant for consolidation for the sake of “efficiency.” Two
examples may illustrate the point. In 1944 Stalin required the merger of the Evangelical Christian
and Baptist denominations to facilitate the streamlining of Kremlin directives to Protestants
through a single, centralized administrative structure. Second, in 2007 Putin managed the
improbable absorption of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) into the Russian
Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, the very body that ROCA had anathematized for decades
as a pawn of the Soviet state. It may be argued that Putin engineered this merger for much the
same reason that Stalin created the Evangelical Christian-Baptist Union: for ease of control, in this
latter case, to better coordinate the utilization of Russian Orthodox/Kremlin soft power abroad.

Factors Behind Increasing Oversight: Fighting Corruption
A commendable aspiration of Rosobrnadzor has been its fight against corruption in higher
education. Transparency International’s most recent Corruption Perceptions Index (2019) ranks
Russia 137th out of 180 countries, a drop from its 131 st place out of 176 countries in 2017.41
Corruption has been a widely recognized feature of Russian life for centuries under both tsars and
commissars. The tsarist era is replete with accounts depicting bribery and corruption as both
corrosive and commonplace, including Journey for Our Time by French memoirist the Marquis de
Custine (1839); The History of a Town (1870) and The Golovlyov Family (1876) by satirist Mikhail
Saltykov-Shchedrin; and most famously, The Inspector General (1836) and Dead Souls (1842) by
Nikolai Gogol. Study of the massive scale of extra-legal economic activity in the Soviet era is
associated especially with the pioneering work of Gregory Grossman, beginning in the 1970s. 42 In

41

transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2019. On current state efforts to combat
corruption in higher education see “Protivodeistvie korruptsii;” obrnadzor.gov.ru.
42 “The Second Economy of the USSR,” Problems of Communism 26 (No. 5, 1977): 25-40. Among the subsequent
legions of studies of corruption in the Soviet Union see Konstantin M. Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1982); William A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom; Combatting Corruption
in the Political Elite, 1965-1990 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Louise L. Shelley, Policing Soviet Society; The
Evolution of State Control (London: Routledge, 1996): and Stephen Lovell, Aleena Ledeneva, and Andrei
Rogachevskii, Bribery and Blat in Russia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); James Heinzen, The Art of the Bribe;
Corruption under Stalin, 1943-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).
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the post-Soviet era, some argue, corruption has reached colossal proportions beyond anything ever
before endured in Russia. Since 1991 the nation’s assets have been plundered for private gain on
a massive scale by a consortium of mafia, state officials, past and present security service
operatives, and newly minted billionaire oligarchs. 43
Corrupt practices in higher education, ubiquitous in the Soviet era, have continued
unabated since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 44 Elizaveta Potapova, research fellow of the
Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
notes that post-secondary education “is particularly vulnerable to corruption” because most faculty
are poorly paid, and many students “are willing to pay instructors for better grades, revised
transcripts, and more.”45 Gennadi Gudkov, head of a Duma Anti-Corruption Committee, estimates
that the bill for corruption in higher education may total the equivalent of one billion dollars
annually. In Moscow alone, this Duma committee asserts, “each year 30 to 40 professors are caught
accepting bribes in exchange for grades.”46
University admissions have been particularly susceptible to malpractice. Bribes to gain
admittance to Moscow universities and institutes are estimated to have totaled $520 million USD
in 2008 alone, with individual student under-the-table payments up to $5,000. In 2009
Rosobrnadzor made mandatory a nationwide standardized higher education admissions test aimed
at eliminating fraud in the process, which did reduce direct bribes. However, corruption is said to
continue through payments for covert distribution of test questions and post-exam correction of
wrong answers.47
Other corrupt practices in higher education include the sale of diplomas and plagiar ized
and ghost-written papers and dissertations. Some studies suggest that since the collapse of the
Soviet Union 30 to 50 percent of Russian doctoral degrees in law and medicine have been

Most stunning and comprehensive is Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy; Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2014). See also Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, Policing Economic Crime in Russia; From Soviet Planned
Economy to Privatization (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); and Vladimir Soloviev, Empire of
Corruption (Tilburg, Netherlands: Glagoslav Publications, 2012).
44 Morgan and Kulikova, “Reform,” 59; Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 206.
45 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 3. See also Anna Numtsova, “In Russia, Corruption Plagues the Higher Education System,” Chronicle of Higher Education 54 (No. 24, 2008), A18-A20.
46 Nemtsova, “In Russia,” A18-A20.
47 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 12-13.
43
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plagiarized and that 20 to 30 percent of dissertations have been “purchased on the black market.” 48
In the same vein, “a 2015 study by the Dissernet Project, an organization dedicated to exposing
academic fraud, found that one in nine politicians in the lower house of the Russian parliame nt
had a plagiarized or fake academic degree.”49 A 2006 Brookings Institution study of Vladimir
Putin’s 1997 dissertation speaks to the pervasiveness of fraud that is seemingly endemic in Russian
higher education. Brookings fellows Clifford Gaddy and Igor Danchenko determined that in
Putin’s dissertation “More than 16 pages worth of text [out of a nearly 20-page segment] were
taken verbatim” from Strategic Planning and Policy by American economists William King and
David Cleland. Even more disturbing than Putin’s plagiarism is the fact that “The scandal…led
nowhere.”50 Given these facts, is it possible for a plagiarist to succeed in superintending a
significant upgrade in the quality of Russian higher education? More colloquially, can a fox guard
a hen house?

Orthodox Advantages and Protestant Disadvantages
State dealings with Russian Orthodox seminaries,

in comparison with Protestant

seminaries, underscore the disadvantages the latter face. On the one hand, theological educator
Zaprometova observes that Orthodox theological schools away from Moscow often face serious
challenges from Rosobrnadzor. As a result, many Orthodox, as well as Protestant seminaries, have
chosen not to seek state accreditation as too burdensome a process. 51 As theologian John Burgess,
author of Holy Rus; The Rebirth of Orthodoxy in the New Russia, has put it, theological educators
of diverse confessions dread the weight of “heavy-handed bureaucracy” that accreditation entails.
Illustrating the “reality of a highly bureaucratized society,” he notes that state authorities
threatened Belgorod Orthodox Seminary with a fine for a minor infraction: its website was said
not to be up-to-date.52 On the other hand, Orthodox institutions in Moscow which have obtained
state accreditation, such as St. Tikhon Orthodox Humanitarian University and the Russian

Stefan Trines, “Academic Fraud, Corruption, and Implications for Credential Assessment,” World Education News
+ Reviews, 10 December 2017; wenr.wes.org/2017/12/academic -fraud-corruption-and-implications-for-credent ialassessment.
49 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 13.
50 Olga Khvostunova. “Plagiarism-gate,” Institute of Modern Russia, 7 May 2013; imrussia.org/en/nation/453plagiarism-gate.
51 Olga Zaprometova, email to author, 9 October 2019; Aleksandr Spichak, email to author, 11 December 2019.
52 John Burgess, phone interview with author, 16 September 2019.
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Orthodox University of St. John the Theologian, have had no difficulty securing it, “probably due
to their political connections and influence.”53
Also to the advantage of Orthodox is the relative ease with which they obtain premises for
instruction. The state, for example, has afforded St. Tikhon and St. John free or nearly free use of
Moscow buildings that had been the property of the Orthodox Church before the 1917 Revolutio n.
Rector John Ekonomtsev of St. John regretted how “very difficult” it was “to actually get a
building free of charge.” The Patriarch reportedly approached Putin personally to help secure St.
John’s building.54 In contrast, Protestant seminaries have typically encountered protracted
difficulties gaining permission to build, lease, or rent property at any cost. Protestant educators
could only hope for the “troubles” Orthodox experience finding facilities. That governme nt
authorities called upon St. Tikhon University to write state standards for theological degrees,
applicable to non-Orthodox, even Jewish and Islamic, as well as Orthodox institutions, is another
indication of the Kremlin’s favoring Orthodoxy. 55 As Russian Academy of Sciences scholar
Roman Lunkin notes, “It is clear from…state religious policy trends that officials often understand
protection of the Russian Orthodox Church as necessitating discrimination of other religio us
communities.”56
It may be argued that the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys the de facto status of an
established church. Patriarch Kyrill’s frequent public appearances with President Putin and the
panoply of legislative restrictions placed upon non-Orthodox faiths since 1997 form the context in
which punitive state scrutiny of Protestant seminaries should be understood. In this author’s 201920 survey of Protestant theological educators and church leaders, three options were posed as
possible explanations for “increasing Russian state oversight of private educational institutio ns,
including Protestant seminaries.” Two of the three have been previously discussed: option one, “a
justifiable effort to standardize higher education and ensure quality,” and option two, “an overall
government strategy to bring all sectors of Russian society under closer state supervision.”

Perry L. Glanzer and Konstantin Petrenko, “Ressurecting the Russian University’s Soul: The Emergence of Eastern
Orthodox Universities and Their Distinctive Approaches to Keeping Faith with Tradition,” Christian Scholar’s Review
36 (Spring 2007): 281. See also Petrenko and Glanzer, “Recent Emergence,” 90.
54 Glanzer and Petrenko, “Resurrecting,” 281.
55 Hunter Baker, “Christian Higher Education Goes to Russia,” Christianity Today online, 2 August 2007; Glanzer
and Petrenko, “Resurrecting,” 273.
56 Lunkin, “Theology,” 13.
53
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The third option offered to account for impediments facing Protestant seminaries is to view
them as part of state measures to discriminate against, and in some cases suppress, non-Orthodox
faiths, in keeping with the close collaboration between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church.
In a sentence, ample evidence exists to conclude that all three factors contribute to the challenges
faced by Protestant pastoral training programs.
This is not the place to enumerate the myriad ways in which Russian state policies margina lize
and state-dominated media malign non-Orthodox faiths, despite formal constitutional protections
for freedom of conscience for all. The Russian Constitution explicitly states, “Religio us
associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law.”57
Just one facet of the uphill struggle faced by Russian Protestants should suffice to illustrate
the point. Compared to the thousands of Russian Orthodox parishes now in possession of churches
returned to them by the state, Protestants and other non-Orthodox confessions frequently struggle
to secure and hold on to places of worship. Roman Lunkin notes that “local officials prefer not to
apply the 2010 Law on Restitution of Property of Religious Significance to Religio us
Organizations to churches other than the Russian Orthodox Church.” Examples abound. Old
Believers have been denied the return of their church buildings in Kirov, St. Petersburg, Saratov,
and their Dormition Church in Moscow. Similarly, Roman Catholics have been unable to retrieve
Sts. Peter and Paul Church in Moscow, nor their previously confiscated sanctuaries in Barnaul,

Mikhail Strokan, “Church-State Relations and Property Restitution in Modern Russia,” Washington, DC, Center
for Strategic & International Relations, 18 August 2016; https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/church-staterelations-and-property-restitution-modern-russia, p. 210. Since the early 1990s the free exercise of religion in postSoviet space has been a constant theme in the pages of the East-West Church and Ministry Report which I served as
editor from 1993 through 2017. For a sampling of reporting on state infringements upon the constitutionally protected
rights of Russian Protestants see: Victoria Arnold, “RUSSIA: 159 Anti-Missionary Prosecutions in 2018—Lis t ,”
Forum 18, 7 May 2019; Victoria Arnold, “RUSSIA: Increasing Land Use Fines ‘a Lottery,’” Forum 18, 20 March
2018; www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_ id=2362; Roman Lunkin, “Do More Than Two Not Gather Together?
Interview with Lawyer and Member of Council of Human Rights of the Russian Presidential Administration, Vlad imir
Ryakhovsky,” Religiya i pravo, 6 December 2016; http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/161206a.html; Lauren
B. Homer, “Making Sense of the Anti-Missionary Provisions of Russia’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation,” East-West
Church and Ministry Report 25 (Spring 2017), 1-7; Roman Lunkin, “Russia: Anti-Evangelism Law Used Against
Foreigners Who Speak in Church,” Human Rights Without Frontiers, 22 September 2016; http://hrwf.eu/russia-antievangelism-law-used-against-foreigners-who...; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual
Report 2019; https://www.uscirf.gov/reports/; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Inventing
Extremists: The Impact of Russian Anti-Extremis m Policies on Freedom of Religion and Belief,” 2017;
https://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/special-reports/inventing -extremists-the-impact-russian-extremis m-policies ;
U.S.
Department
of
State,
2018
Report
on
International Religious Freedom:
Russia;
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018...: “Yarovaya Law Strikes Protestants; Interview with Historian of Religion Elena
Glavatskaia,” Ploitsovet, 19 January 2018; https://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/180119c.html; William
Yoder, “A Commentary on Russia’s New Anti-Terror Legislation” 15 July 2016; rea-moskva.org.
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Belgorod, Blagoveshchensk, Chita, Kirov, Krasnoyarsk, and Smolensk. Most egregious, the state
has turned over various non-Orthodox houses of worship to the Russian Orthodox Church: more
than a dozen former Catholic and Lutheran churches were handed over to Orthodox in Kaliningrad,
the former Prussian city of Konigsburg, and the same for a Catholic church in Belgorod. Lutherans
have also unsuccessfully appealed for the return of churches in Krasnodar, Smolensk, Simferopo l,
Sudak, Yalta, and Evpatoria.58
In contrast, Protestants, other than Lutherans, have few historic properties that would be
eligible for restitution, though two secularized Baptist sanctuaries in Kaliningrad and St.
Petersburg should be candidates.59 Instead, Protestant struggles for places to worship typically
have involved the denial of building permits, Orthodox pressure on local owners to refuse or to
revoke lease and rental agreements, and local officials prohibiting the use of private residences for
worship.
It follows predictably that in this general climate of state partiality toward Orthodox and
discrimination against non-Orthodox, Protestant seminaries would suffer. Roman Lunkin well
summarizes this point:
Educational institutions founded by other [non-Orthodox] faiths and denominations—
above all, Protestants—function under the pressure of constant inspections, and have
even faced closure. The campaign against such institutions form a logical part of the
state’s policy of restricting non-Orthodox mission, banning worship services in private
homes, and barring Protestant church construction. It would be strange, after all, if the
authorities looked kindly upon Christians receiving higher theological education
unimpeded, while at the same time placing fines on them and confiscating their property. 60

Conflicting Views on the Applicability of Religious Versus Educational Legislation Upon
Seminaries
The precise legislative basis for Rosobrnadzor audits and penalties imposed upon
Protestant seminaries is a matter of debate. Reporter Victoria Arnold, in a detailed treatment of the
subject for the freedom of conscience news service Forum 18, contends, “Religious educational
institutions are under no obligation to acquire state accreditation, and many have operated for years

Lunkin, “Theology,” 13. See also Sophia Kishkovsky, “Russia to Return Church Property,” New York Times, 23
November 2010.
59 Lunkin, “Theology,” 13.
60 Lunkin, “Theology,” 11.
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without it, including the Baptist and Pentecostal seminaries discussed here, the Catholic Church’s
Mary, Queen of the Apostles Higher Seminary in St. Petersburg, and the Lutheran Church
Seminary in Novosaratovka, near St. Petersburg.” Furthermore, Rosobrnadzor inspections are
undertaken on the basis of “somewhat vague legislation [that] may be misapplied, e.g. in the two
parallel systems of state-accredited and non-state-accredited religious educational institutions.”

61

Regarding 2018-19 audits of Moscow’s Baptist and Pentecostal seminaries, Arnold
wonders “why inspectors had treated the courses offered by these religious educational
establishments as if they were state-accredited and therefore obliged to abide by state
requirements, when according to the law…such institutions have the right to offer non-stateaccredited programmes which must conform only to the standards of the responsible religio us
organization.” The consequence, she argues, is “the possibility of disproportionate punishment for
infractions which are minor or which institutions themselves insist they have not committed. Such
punishments include suspension of admissions, suspension of activities, and revocation of
licences–all of which arguably have a greater longer-term impact on an institution’s functio ning
than a fine.”62
In contrast to Forum 18’s interpretation, Russian authorities insist–and carry the day– that
Protestant seminaries are subject to both 1997 legislation, “On Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Associations” (125-FZ), as amended 19 times between 2000 and 2016,63 and 2012
legislation, “On Education in the Russian Federation” (273-FZ). As Moscow Evangelical Christian
Seminary President Sergei Chervonenko relates, 2018-19 Rosobrnadzor inspections focused on
provisions of 2012 “On Education” legislative requirements, “practically without touching or
gently circumventing everything related to 125-FZ [the 1997 Law On Freedom of Conscience].”
Chervonenko continues, “In practice, it turned out that some religious universities [and seminar ies]
were not ready for such a development of events and emphasized their religious status.”
Nevertheless, “Those [seminaries] that insisted that they were not bound by the requirements of
the 2012 law proved to be mistaken.”64

Victoria Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions to Protestant Theological Education ‘Systemic, Intentional’?” Forum 18,
25 March 2019.
62 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.”
63
https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/russia/2941574/on-freedo m-of-conscience-and-relig ious associations-act.html.
64 Chervonenko, “Proverka.”
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A key mechanism for state (Rosobrnadzor) oversight of higher education is its authority to
license and accredit.65 A license permits an institution to conduct educational programs and to
admit students, while accreditation allows an institution “to award nationally recognized degrees,”
to extend military deferments to students, and to afford graduates the right to seek employment in
the government sector and to pursue graduate degrees in state-accredited universities.66
A series of 2008 Rosobrnadzor higher education inspections determined that many private
sector programs, including many Protestant seminaries, were operating without a valid license,
and as a result, were forced to close. 67 More recently, between January 2018 and March 2019,
Rosobrnadzor conducted audits of 16 religious educational programs (two Russian Orthodox, three
Muslim, three Baptist, two Pentecostal, one Adventist, and five additional Protestant). Inspectors
recorded violations in all but one case. 68 Penalties ran the gamut: fines, suspended or revoked
licenses, suspension of admissions, suspension of instruction, and revocation of accreditation. As
Andrei Kortunov observed, “This dependency has been considered by the majority of the Russian
educational community to be a liability, and all the history of the Russian higher education
demonstrates continuous attempts of universities to achieve more autonomy from state
bureaucrats.”69
Victoria Arnold’s Forum 18 reporting devotes considerable space to the consequences of
2018-19 inspections upon three Protestant institutions–Moscow Theological Seminary of
Evangelical Christians-Baptists (MTS), the Eurasian Theological Seminary of the Russian
Pentecostal Union (ETS), and the interdenominational Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary
(MECS).

Moscow Theological Seminary of Evangelical Christians-Baptists
Moscow Theological Seminary (MTS) has been the leading pastoral training program of the
Evangelical Christian-Baptist (ECB) Union. Successor to the correspondence course permitted by
Soviet authorities beginning in 1968, its residential instruction commenced in 1993 in Moscow in
the ECB headquarters on Varshavskoye Shosse, shifting in 2002 to its own facility in a renovated

Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 204.
Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 17; Lunkin, “Theology,” 11.
67 Chervonenko, “Proverka.”
68 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.”
69 Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 204.
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elementary school building. At the beginning of 2020 MTS was instructing some 375 students in
Moscow and another 555 in eight additional distance learning centers across Russia. 70
Following an October 2018 inspection, Rosobrnadzor cited MTS for “gross violation of
the requirements and conditions of a special permit (license),” leading to a court case against the
school on 18 October. The seminary submitted responses to Rosobrnadzor citations on 19
November and 28 December. Meanwhile, on 27 December Moscow’s Perovo District Court found
the seminary non-compliant and ordered a 60-day suspension of activities.71
In the midst of a follow-up inspection, 15-17 January 2020, a seminary appeal of the court
decision failed. The suspension began on 25 January with the sealing of the building by bailiffs.
On 15 February 2020 Rosobrnadzor also imposed a ban on new MTS admissions. Courts
subsequently extended the suspension, including a prohibition on the use of the seminary building
for any purpose. At this point the seminary reverted to a non-formal, non-credit instructio na l
program back on the premises of the ECB headquarters building under conditions reminiscent of
the semi-underground pastoral training of the Soviet era.
Most recently, on 27 February 2020, came word of a Moscow arbitration court’s revocation
of the MTS license. According to the seminary’s stunned Vice-Rector for Academic Affairs
Aleksei Markevich,
The main complaint of a “violation” of licensing requirements was the “incorrect” form of
a document describing the teaching load, although this form was developed in accordance
with the law…. Revocation of a license is an extreme measure, which the government uses
when an organization, by its activity, grossly violates the law and threatens society, the
state, or citizens. Evidently the judge saw in our seminary such a threat. Many ask, what is
the reason for such a decision. I see it as a carte blanche that is given to the Russian
bureaucracy and the lack of independent judicial procedures. But that is my personal
opinion, a person who has tried for a year and a half to do everything to satisfy this
bureaucracy [Rosobrnadzor], which turned out to be impossible.
Two months prior, in December 2019, perhaps in anticipation of a worst-case scenario, Rector
Peter Mitskevich had written in a communication to the entire ECB denomination, “We want to

Elliott, “Protestant Theological Education,” 14; Dale Kemp, email to author, 25 February 2020;
russianleadership.org/our-ministry/. A goal for 2020 for Russian Leadership Ministries is to facilitate the opening of
additional distance learning centers in Smolensk, Bryansk, Elabuga, and Krasnodar. Moscow Theological Seminary
Annual Report, 2019.
71 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions;” Dale Kemp, email to author, 25 February 2020.
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be obedient to God here. It is all in His hands. We will train people to be gospel servants whether
it is unofficial in the church, or in an official seminary context.”72
Mitskevich, who has served as rector of MTS since 2007 and as president of the ECB Union
since 2017, has clearly been laboring under a formidable administrative burden. 73 His heavy
workload, which also includes pastoring Moscow’s Golgotha ECB Church since 2004, means he
may not always have been able to give sufficient attention to documentation that a highly
bureaucratic Russian administration requires and that a truly fulltime rector would have been able
to oversee. In addition, Roman Lunkin suggests, “Rosobrnadzor bureaucrats expect documentatio n
to be drawn up by the experts they have recommended. Protestant institutions like the Moscow
Baptist Seminary insist on their independence, however, and thus have ended up adopting a
confrontational approach.”74
To have survived intact in its bouts with the Ministry of Education and Science, Lunkin
believes MTS leadership would have to have been “more polite and loyal.”75 Rosobrnadzor, for
its part, is increasingly combative towards any institution that fails to sufficiently conform. In an
interview with Roman Lunkin, Dr. Mitskevich shared his belief that the climate of distrust of nonOrthodox fostered by the 2016 Yarovaya “Anti-Terrorist” Law helps explain the troubles faced by
his seminary:
Any law can result in benefit or harm, and unfortunately the Yarovaya Law has
brought much harm; it has in essence become an anti-missionary law that has instilled fear
among believers and created problems for churches. I am a doctor by profession, and I
often think about how not to cause harm but instead to help. Yet the first thought of our
security agencies is usually to look for guilt and a concrete reason why someone may be
prosecuted. The Church’s calling is to spread faith—that is what missionary activity is
about. Yet how often are we not healed, helped, or warned here, but forced into a corner
straight away, as when Rosobrnadzor suspended the activity of our Moscow Theologica l
Seminary in early 2019. Our country must try to walk the path of prayer with God and trust
“Court Revokes License of Moscow Theological Seminary of Evangelical Christians -Baptists,” Invictory.org, 28
February 2020; translated in Russia Religion News; https://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/200228a.html; Peter
Mitskevich,
“Words
from
the
President
–
December
2019,”
28
December
2019;
https://baptist.org.ru/en/news/view/articles/1535153. See also Lunkin, “Theology,” 11-12; Michael Thom, “Russia
Shuts Down Baptist and Pentecostal Seminaries,” 2 April 2019; https://Baptist.org.ru/en/news/vies/article/153515;
https://www.chvnradio.com/christian-news/russia-shuts-down-baptist-and-pentecostal-seminaries. Markevich related
to MTS professor Nikolai Kornilov that documentation required by state inspectors was amounting to a mountain of
paperwork. Nikolai Kornilov, interview, 23 May 2019.
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Christian Daily,” 12 June 2018; Roman Lunkin, interview, 22 May 2019.
74 Lunkin, “Theology,” 12.
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for one another, but we are ruled by suspicion, fear, and doubt. There is no desire for
reconciliation; everyone is shut away from everyone else behind iron doors. The Yarovaya
Law has become a law of intimidation that can be used at any moment against any preacher,
whereas there should be an enlightened and respectful attitude towards religio us
believers.76

A number of individuals interviewed by this author in Moscow in May 2019 expressed an
opinion similar to one voiced by journalist Dr. William Yoder in March 2020, that MTS “had
refused to do the necessary homework and instead chose to accuse the state. No one I heard in
Moscow claimed there is a general, state-introduced closing of seminaries in the country. But my
impression may be too optimistic.”77 Whatever shortcomings MTS may have been guilty of in
terms of paperwork, ongoing troubles with state inspections at a host of additional Protestant
institutions would suggest a pattern of discrimination that goes well beyond one seminar y’s
purported insufficient attention to state higher education documentation requirements. This author
is in receipt of too many communications from too many beleaguered Russian Protestant educators
to believe otherwise.
In the wake of the late February 2020 court decision, Dale Kemp, president of Russian
Leadership Ministries, which raises Western financial support for MTS, summarized the
seminary’s present plight and prospects: “We have no accreditation; we have lost our license in
Moscow; we are being pushed out into the churches, offering non-credit seminars.” In addition,
fire marshal inspections in February-March 2020 generated citations that could cost the equivale nt
of $50,000 to 60,000 to remedy—in a building to which faculty and students have no access. Still,
Kemp noted, there has been no curtailment of MTS instruction underway online,

via

correspondence, or in its distance learning centers—trends in non-residential education well
underway before the school’s present troubles. 78 As a last resort, “We are still going to appeal to
European courts,” even though Russia often ignores their rulings. 79

Lunkin, “Theology,” 14. See also Peter Mitskevich, “Words from the President-February 2020,” 14 February 2020;
https://baptist. org.ru/en/news/view/article/1539124.
77 William Yoder, email to author, 14 March 2020.
78 Over the past decade non-traditional instruction, especially online, has been a growing trend worldwide, now
accelerating in the midst of the present corona virus pandemic [winter-spring 2020]. A recent survey of Evangelical
seminaries worldwide documents the post-Soviet region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia as a leader in the
movement. Paul Clark, “Survey on Online Theological Education,” Overseas Council, 2019, 4.
79 Dale Kemp phone interview, 30 March 2020.
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The Eurasian Theological Seminary
The Pentecostal Union’s Eurasian Theological Seminary (ETS) has faced the same state
scrutiny as MTS. Following an inspection 19-22 February 2018, Rosobrnadzor ordered ETS to
correct cited violations by 22 March 2018. Forum 18’s Arnold writes,
According to the record…on Rosobrnadzor’s website, most of these related to how
the seminary was run day-to-day, including an apparent lack of consultation with
student representatives, lack of provision of sporting and cultural activities, and the
absence of particular documents on its website.”80
Academy of Sciences religion scholar Roman Lunkin concurs with Arnold’s assessment: “The
misdemeanors

of which the Moscow Theological Seminary stands accused are purely

bureaucratic.”81
Dissatisfied with ETS responses, Rosobrnadzor took the seminary to court, leading to a
fine of 150,000 rubles ($2,300) by Lyublino District Court on 25 April 2018, which was upheld
by Moscow City Court on 2 July 2018. Meanwhile, ETS faced an unplanned Rosobrnadzor
inspection 30 April-4 May 2018, which led to a suspension of ETS admissions on 1 June 2018, a
suspension of ETS’s license on 9 August 2018, and the annulment of its license on 23 November
2018, at which point the seminary was “obliged to stop offering certificated courses.”82
In contrast to the position taken by Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary’s Sergey
Chervonyenko that seminaries are subject to Rosobrnadzor’s accreditation as well as licensing
standards, Pentecostal Union lawyer Vladimir Ozolin has objected to Rosobrnadzor’s
treating the [Eurasian Theological] Seminary’s non-state-accredited theology bachelor’s
degree as if it corresponded to the degree of theology on the Education Ministry’s formal
“List of Areas of Higher Education Preparation – Undergraduate.” This was despite the
materials submitted to the inspection clearly indicating that the [ETS] course was intended
for the training of clergy and church personnel and was therefore not subject to the same
organizational and administrative requirements as a state-accredited programme.83
An official with the Church of God (Cleveland), with which ETS is affiliated, writes that the
seminary “did face some extreme inspections on short notice along with just about every other
evangelical seminary in Russia.” Fortunately for ETS, he writes, on 7 November 2019 the
seminary
Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.”
Lunkin, “Theology,” 11.
82 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.”
83 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.”
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received a new license from the Moscow City Department of Education and Science.
Again, terminology is different, but we are still in operation. ETS currently gives training
to about 850 people, including residential, extension, and online [programs]. It seems that
the inspection of the seminaries in 2018 was only the first wave. 84
As a member of Russia’s Public Chamber appointed by Putin in 2006, Bishop Sergei
Ryakhovsky, head of Russia’s second-largest Pentecostal denomination, is something of a de facto
spokesperson for all of Russia’s Protestant churches. Nevertheless, he appears to have been
powerless to provide effectual cover on behalf of his denomination’s ETS. Nor has his appointme nt
by Putin to the Public Chamber impeded increasing numbers of threats to the property of
Pentecostal churches in Oryol, Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, Novorossiysk, Krasnodar, Tatarstan,
and Tula.85 In the opinion of attorney Ozolin, state restrictions imposed upon Protestant seminarie s
are part of a more comprehensive effort to exert “pressure…on the non-traditional confessions. ”86
The lengthy litigation being endured by MTS & ETS, along with the close state scrutiny of many
other Protestant seminaries (and churches), is reminiscent of the concerted court effort over the
years to disenfranchise Salvation Army ministry in Russia. 87

The 2016 Anti-Extremist Law
Forum 18’s Victoria Arnold compiled a list of prosecutions in 2018 under the Yarovaya
Anti-Extremist Law of 2016. Ostensibly directed at the threat posed by Islamic radicals, it in fact
primarily targets Protestants. Of 159 known prosecutions in 2018 under this 2016 law, only 15
took action against Russian Muslims. In contrast, Protestants faced charges of unlawful missio nar y
activity in 104 cases (50 Pentecostals, 39 Baptists, 5 Seventh-day Adventists, and 10 other
Protestants).88 The arbitrariness of Yarovaya Law enforcement is well illustrated by the fate of two
churches in 2018 reported by Forum 18. The Good News Mission Pentecostal Church in Ufa,
Bashkortostan, was fined 30,000 rubles ($4,600) for failure to display its official full name at its
entrance, whereas an Evangelical Christian-Baptist House of Prayer in the Perm Region was found

84
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in violation of the law because it did display its full name outside the church. According to the
court verdict, the ECB signage amounted to “missionary activity aimed at dissemina ting
information about the beliefs of [the church] among other persons who are not members.”89

The Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary
The interdenominational Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary (MECS) is no stranger
to close state oversight. Founded by One Mission Society, a U.S.-based Evangelical missio n
agency, MECS was briefly shuttered by Rosobrnadzor in the summer of 2007 for alleged “fire
violations and for failing to offer a quality education.”90 MECS recouped and reopened, but it has
continued to be the object of Rosobrnadzor inspections, most recently in October 2018. Being one
of the last Protestant seminaries to face inspection in 2018, MECS drew lessons from the
experience of others. According to MECS administrator Sergey Chervonenko, “Observing the
results of the audit at one of the Moscow seminaries, we understood that the process would be
difficult and tried to prepare as much as possible.” Harold Brown, OMS missionary and MECS
board chair, characterized the most recent lead inspector as “tough,” but one who in the end upheld
the school’s accreditation.91

Other Protestant Institutions
Representative of Protestant seminary challenges far afield from Moscow is the experience
of the Pentecostal Chuvash Bible Centre. In 2007 state authorities shuttered this school on grounds
that it “conducted educational activities without authorization” and allegations of fire and
sanitation code violations. The school took its grievance to the European Court of Human Rights
in 2008 and eventually won its case in 2014. 92
A Rosobrnadzor inspection of the Evangelical Christian-Baptist North Caucasus Bible
Institute (Prokhladny, Kabardino – Balkaria Republic) on 27-28 June 2018 ended with citations
for non-compliance with educational, sanitation, and fire safety standards. Prokhladny District
Arnold, “RUSSIA: 159.” See also U.S. Department of State, 2018 Report, 7.
Baker, “Russian Seminaries’ Enrollment Woes.”
91 Brown explained that Alexander Tsutserov (St. Andrews University Ph.D.) is president of Moscow Evangelical
Christian Seminary (MECS), while Sergey Chervonenko (Asbury Theological Seminary D.Min .) is president of
Evangelical Christian Seminary at the same location. Brown phone interview, 22 November 2019, and Brown email,
25 February 2020. Chervonenko explained the same arrangement to the author in a 21 May 2019 interview in Moscow.
92 “Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia: ECHR, 12 June 2014;” https://swarb.co.uk/biblical-centre-ofthe-chuvash-republic-v-russia-echr-12-jun-2014; Arnold, RUSSIA: Obstructions.”
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Court imposed a fine of 150,000 rubles ($2,300) on 27 August 2018. An additional inspection, 1519 October 2018, led Rosobrnadzor to charge the institute and Rector Mikhail Chizhma with
failure to rectify educational and other violations. In November 2018 Rosobrnadzor suspended the
school’s right to admit new students. By latest report the institute, nevertheless, continues to offer
its educational program to the satisfaction of denominational if not state standards. 93
Also in November 2018 Kuban Evangelical Christian University (KECS) in Krasnodar had
its license temporarily suspended. Originally founded as Lampados Bible College under the
sponsorship of the U.S. Christian and Missionary Alliance denomination, this seminary’s rector,
Gennadi Pshenichny, nevertheless manages a hopeful note: “This past year we faced many
challenges as the state education agency paid several visits to our campus. Still, God is faithful
and we continue to work and study even though the future may at times seem uncertain.”94

Further Tightening of State Requirements
Sergey Chervonenko (MECS) anticipates that the next hurdle that Robsobrnadzor may
erect is state verification of the degrees held by higher education faculty: “In the future they may
well introduce requirements to confirm the level of teaching staff in Russia,” an especially ominous
prospect for Protestant seminaries.95 In Russia’s current anti-Western climate closer scrutiny of
staff degrees does not bode well for these schools which depend heavily upon Western support
and whose administrators and faculty so often hold theological degrees from Europe and the U.S.
It is widely recognized that Western ties and support taint Protestant institutions and Protestants
in general.96 Case in point is Moscow’s Russian-American Christian University (RACU), one of
only two Russian Evangelical liberal arts programs to receive state accreditation, along with
Zaoksky Adventist University near Tula. 97 RACU’s hard-won accreditation, awarded in 2003, was

Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions;” Lunkin, “Theology,” 12.
Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019. See also “Rosobrnadzor Bans Acceptance of Students to
Seminary
of
Evangelical-Lutheran
Church,”
Interfax,
13
December
2019;
interfaxreligion.com/?act=news&div=15405.
95 Sergey Chervonenko, “Proverka.”
96 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019; John Burgess, phone interview with author, 16 September
2019; Church of God, emails to author, 4 and 31 December 2019; Scott Cunningham, phone interview, 31 March
2020; Dale Kemp, phone interview, 30 March 2020; Gennadi Sergienko, interview, 24 May 2019; U.S. Department
of State, 2018 Report, 16.
97 Mikhail Kulakov, God’s Soviet Miracles: How Adventists Built the First Protestant Seminary in Russian History
(Nampa, ID: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1993); Petrenko and Glanzer, “The Recent Emergence,” 90-91.
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lost in 2009, in good measure because Rosobrnadzor changed accreditation requirements to no
longer credit faculty with Western doctorates in calculating the number of qualified instructors. 98
Russian Protestant seminary faculty are now even beginning to be required to undergo
“state-recognized advanced theological training” leading to a “diploma in theological pedagogy”
from a secular university, “as absurd as it sounds.”99 Compounding this imposition forced upon
Kuban Evangelical Christian University, the secular institute affiliated with Kuban State
University that offers this new diploma has already doubled the tuition for this mandatory
training.100
“Audits” of the Auditors: From Sympathetic to Strongly Critical
On balance, Sergei Chervonenko (MECS) desires to give state auditors the benefit of the
doubt:
After a scheduled inspection of Rosobrnadzor [RON], we reported on the implementa tio n
of the requirements and received an unscheduled inspection of RON with a new staff of
inspectors. This taught us that different experts can interpret the requirements in differe nt
ways; one expert will say “normal,” the other – “violation.” Yes, that’s right, some
decisions are subjective. It is necessary to interact with each expert individually. Diffic ult
and unpredictable? Yes. Is it possible to handle this? Definitely possible…. It is important
to interact with RON experts; they pay attention to the tone of communication of the tested,
the willingness to listen to their comments and involvement in the correction of the
shortcomings found. RON experts are living people, no matter how trite it sounds; they
value a good attitude (but do not allow attempts to “grease the palm”). And even RON
experts can make a mistake. Yes, this is so. They have to study a huge array of documents,
and given our religious specificity, the likelihood of error increases.101
Even hard-pressed Rector Pshenichny in Kuban can marshal up charity toward individ ua l
Rosobrnadzor inspectors:
When it comes to personal interactions with officials the situation can change…. People
begin to ask questions and see the disparity between what they see and hear on TV [about
Protestants] and real life. They become much more balanced and open to dialogue. Some
of them make efforts to help us. Some become genuinely interested in Christianity. 102
98

Bernbaum, Opening the Red Door, 199; Mark R. Elliott, Review of Opening the Red Door; The Inside Story of
Russia’s First Christian Liberal Arts University in Christianity Today online, 17 February 2020.
99 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019.
100 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019; Harold Brown, phone interview, 22 November 2019. In
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Nevertheless, Pshenichny judges Rosobrnadzor’s overall implementation of oversight as
“a profanation of education, relegating it to a piece of paper with a stamp.” He openly critiques
this state body, which holds a Damocles Sword over the life of his seminary, in a manner that is
both searching and courageous. When queried by the author concerning state oversight of private
educational institutions, he judged it to be a combination of a) an effort to standardize and ensure
quality, b) part of an overall government goal to bring all sectors of Russian society under closer
state supervisions, and c) part of state measures to discriminate against, and in some cases,
suppress, non-Orthodox faiths:
It is common knowledge that the overall state of education in Russia leaves much to be
desired. Therefore, I would say that it is not at all surprising that the state has taken upon
itself the effort to standardize higher education. However, speaking from my experience in
the field of education, I would say that ensuring quality is not a top priority of the Ministr y
of Education. It is virtually impossible to find people in today’s system who would be
genuinely interested in education. We hear slogans and goals but that’s just words. Most
of what we see is a vast gap between what is being proclaimed and even written on paper–
and real everyday life. The system is set up in such a way that officials have to give account
to their supervisors and so they react only as prompted. The inspections are genuine ly
interested only in checking off their lists and finding faults with the schools so they can
report back to their respective supervisors and prove they are effective. They do not care
about education in the least. In this, they are part of the larger system and not necessarily
discriminating against one group or another. The tendency is to stifle initiative anywhere
and lay [down a] heavy burden, which creates a façade of uniformity and order. This is just
how things work.
At the same time the discrimination against non-Orthodox faiths, especially evangelic a ls,
has always been there. It is twofold. First, there are those who are ideologically opposed
and purposefully malign and denigrate non-Orthodox believers through every means
possible. And then there are those who are “strengthening” the hands of the first group
through ignorance. Unfortunately, evangelicals still make up a fraction of the overall
population of the country and this works against us because the community at large is still
in the dark about who we are. The connection with the West does not help. Current
sentiment in the media is anti-West and anti-US.103
In the same vein Kursk Protestant educator Aleksandr Spichak writes, “Of course, when it
comes to Protestant schools, you cannot escape subjectivity because it is in the air in Russia, when
the nationalism and anti-American attitude is promoted everywhere. And there might be men in
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local administration who would use this opportunity to press more on Protestants.”104 A
denominational leader close to the Eurasian Theological Seminary seconds the opinion of
Pshenichny and Spichak in reference to dealings with Rosobrnadzor: “To answer your questions,
is it a justifiable effort to standardize education? We are not of this opinion. We fulfilled all of the
state’s demands. But there was no effort from the state to work with us to help us ensure that their
standards were met.”105
Especially telling is Rosobrnadzor’s draconian treatment of two secular institutions: the
European University of St. Petersburg and the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences,
private universities with stellar international reputations. 106 Rosobrnadzor cancelled the former’s
accreditation and revoked its license in 2016 over alleged building code infractions and took
possession of most of its campus property in early 2018. Accreditation was restored in July 2018,
but not before Rosobrnadzor had dealt the university a near-lethal blow.107 On 20 June 2019
Rosobrnadzor also revoked the accreditation of the highly regarded Moscow School of Social and
Economic Sciences which, however, was restored in March 2020. 108
Two leading Western professional bodies, the U.S.-based Association for Slavic, East
European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) and its sister British Association for Slavic, East
European, and Eurasian Studies (BASEEES), publicly addressed their concerns to Russian
authorities, expressing “great disappointment” with Rosobrnadzor actions against the two schools.
An ASEEES press release described the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences as “one
of the country’s most highly regarded universities” and the European University of St. Petersburg
as “another of the country’s leading private universities.”109
Just as bold as Rector Pshenichny’s critique of Rosobrnadzor, the European University of
St. Petersburg prepared a 24-page “audit” of the auditors entitled “How Does Rosobrnadzor Work:
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Analysis of Open Data on Supervisory Activities in the Sphere of Higher Education.” More
accustomed to enumerating the institutional shortcomings of others, Rosobnrnadzor in this
instance was subjected to a searching critique of its own ethical and procedural shortcomings. The
European University report gave this state higher education watchdog a low, if not failing, grade
in a wide-ranging series of findings:


The number of higher education institutions is decreasing year by year. However, the
number of supervisory activities is increasing.



Private universities are much more likely to be inspected. Effective performance
indicators do not significantly reduce the likelihood of an inspection….The actual
inspection is largely detached from the monitoring results and it is not always consistent
with the performance indicators developed by the Ministry of Education.



The procedure of selecting experts [auditors] does not prevent the enlisting of
specialists who have violated ethical norms in their professional activities. Among
these experts there are authors of dissertations with sizeable borrowings from other
people’s texts. Indicators of the publication activity of such experts demonstrate that
they are on average more prone to manipulating formal performance indicators of
academic activity than most other lecturers.



Inspections are increasingly being carried out remotely, in the form of working with
documents without visiting the university. The inspectors focus on minor violatio ns
mainly related to documenting the work of the institution.110

Regarding inspections not conducted on site that are cited in the final bullet, it should be noted that
in all known cases Protestant seminaries have undergone in-person inspections. Given their small
enrollments, compared to those of most other private institutions and all state universities, might
this focused attention on Protestants have more to do with discrimination against a suspect
religious minority than with the goal of fostering high educational standards?

Katerina Guba, Aleksandra Makeeva, Mikhail Sokolov, and Anzhelika Tsivinskaya, “Kak rabotaet Rosobrnadzor:
analiz otkrytykh dannykh o kontrolʹno—nadzornoi deyatelʹnost v sfere vysshego obrazovaniya [“How Does
Rosobrnadzor Work: Analysis of Open Data on Supervisory Activities in the Sphere of Higher Education],” St.
Petersburg: European University in St. Petersburg, 2017; https//eusp.org/en/news/how-does-rosobrnadzor-workanalysis-of-open-data-supervisory-activities-in-the-sphere-of-higher-education.
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Conclusion
In sum, Russian Protestant seminaries are presently undergoing a trial by state inspectio n
that threatens their very existence. Academics Perry Glanzer and Konstantin Petrenko are correct
in asserting that the Russian state’s “power to license and accredit” is “the power of life and death”
over any educational institution.111
State justifications for close oversight of Protestant seminaries appear overstated at best
and lack credibility at worst. As regards state concerns for quality control, should not the Russ ian
constitution’s requirement for separation of church and state take precedence over a secular
government’s presumption to instruct believers on how best to train their clergy?
Russia’s declining student-age population has led leaders in public higher education to
lobby the state to curtail private universities and institutes. And on its own account the state has
concluded the country needs far fewer tertiary institutions in general. But Russia’s Protestant
population of approximately two percent means the quite modest enrollments in its non-statefunded seminaries cannot possibly be a demographic threat to public higher education. 112
The concerted efforts of the administration of President Vladimir Putin to exert ever greater
control over all sectors of Russian life is much in keeping with the country’s longstanding tradition
of authoritarian rule. Russia’s Protestant seminaries labor under the additional burden of the
common, Russian media-stoked perception of Protestantism as a Western import—and this in a
climate of chauvinistic nationalism and xenophobia. A Russian News Agency TASS release of 6
April 2020 underscores this ever-present threat to Protestant seminaries. Proposed Duma
legislation would further impair the work of “foreign NGOs,” including “foreign-funded
educational programmes…likely to be subjected to additional sanction and scrutiny.”113 Such a
prospect would further jeopardize those Protestant seminaries that still receive financial support
from abroad.
A key question addressed in this study centers on the Russian state’s motivation for
increased state restrictions on Protestant seminaries. Has it been to ensure quality, or to strengthen
state control over all sectors of Russian society, or to discriminate against non-Orthodox
Glanzer and Petrenko, “Private Christian Colleges,” 11.
The two percent estimate is based on the current Russian Federation population of 145,872,000 (United Nations
World Population Review; worldpopulationreview.com) and Roman Lunkin’s calculation that the number of the
country’s Protestant adherents “is approaching 3 million” (Pyat’sot let vmeste,” Nezavisamaya gazeta —Religii, 18
October 2017; http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2017-10-18/ 13_ 430_together.html).
113 William Yoder, “Russian Seminaries Remain in Limbo: The Future Remains Uncertain,” 6 April 2020.
111

112

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2020) XL, 4

28

believers—or some combination of the three? One Russian Orthodox educator, who prefers not to
be identified, rejects the idea that new government requirements placed on Protestant seminar ies
amounts to persecution. He argues, for example, that Baptists did not do their homework in
preparing documents for inspectors. In sum, he sees the government upholding standards for all
educational institutions to ensure quality, a process he considers normal and positive.114
A contrasting view is held by Dale Kemp of Russian Leadership Ministries who believes
the state’s desire for improved quality is a minor consideration—if one at all. Rather, he views the
goal of increased secular control and discrimination against non-Orthodox to be the chief state
motivators, an opinion held by most Protestant educators who have fared poorly in Ministry of
Education inspections.115
In the present COVID-19 pandemic, Evangelical seminaries and churches, like all other
Russian institutions, have closed their doors to gatherings of any size for the duration of the crisis.
Acting in bad faith, might Russian authorities prolong restrictions upon gatherings of nonOrthodox beyond the point of medical necessity? Fears that authoritarian regimes might take
advantage of emergency measures to undermine the rule of law have already surfaced not only in
the case of Russia, but as regards Hungary, Serbia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.116
Finally, a particularly questionable justification for increasing Russian state oversight of
private higher education, including Protestant seminaries, is the purported goal of rooting out
corruption. Official campaigns against it are a predictable, periodic feature of Russian politica l
life. Unfortunately, a tradition also prevails of a self-aggrandizing bureaucracy seeking its own
benefit over the interests of state and society. How then is a corrupt state capable of elimina ting
corruption in higher education, public or private? And in the case of Protestant seminaries, the
Ministry of Education, notwithstanding its proclivity to find fault, does not even bother to charge
corruption in Protestant seminaries, where it is rare to non-existent. Similarly, what effort have
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auditors expended to understand Evangelical subculture when they insist upon letter-of-the- law
“No Smoking” signage in a building in which no one smokes? 117
In contrast to the problematic interventions of Rosobrnadzor, since the 1990s many
Protestant theological schools have chosen self-regulation through their own commendably
professional Euro-Asian Accrediting Association (E-AAA).118 The Russian Ministry of Education
and Science could learn a great deal from the example of E-AAA in the promotion and facilita tio n
of high professional standards in tertiary education. Dr. Walter Sawatsky (Anabaptist Mennonite
Biblical Seminary) details its achievements in a forthcoming publication, “The Amazing Story of
E-AAA (Euro-Asian Accrediting Association).” Here we have an enumeration of the association’s
exemplary role as “a leader in shaping and building up a Slavic Evangelical ministry for the sake
of the churches, to foster a consciously Slavic theology, and also contextual sensitivity in Central
Asia.” In addition to supportive, rather than confrontational, seminary accreditation site visits, EAAA has facilitated the publication of classroom texts (Bible Pulpit Series), theological serials
(especially the bilingual Bogoslovskie razmyshleniya/Theological Reflections), Evangelica l
archival guides and compendia,

theological reference works (such as the Slavic Bible

Commentary),119 the regular hosting of academic and pedagogical conferences, and especially
commendable, the promotion of “cooperation across a spectrum of [theological and nationa l]
differences.” In contrast, Sawatsky suspects “Putin’s new controls on Russian education…had
more to do with blocking innovation than seeking ‘best practices’.”120 Thus, it can reasonably be
argued that Russian society and the rule of law would best be served if the state simply left its
Protestant seminaries to their own devices.
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Appendix: Interviews and Correspondence
Interviews
John Burgess (phone), Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 16 September 2019
Harold Brown (phone), One Mission Society, 22 November 2019
Sergey Chervonenko, Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary, 21 May 2019
Scott Cunningham (phone), Overseas Council, 31 March 2020
Dale Kemp, Russian Leadership Ministries, 30 March 2020
Nikolai Kornilov, Moscow Theological Seminary, 23 May 2019
Roman Lunkin, Russian Academy of Sciences, 22 May 2019
Russian Orthodox educator, 23 May 2019
Gennadi Sergienko, Second Evangelical Christian-Baptist Church and Moscow
Theological Seminary, 24 May 2019
Email Correspondence
Sergey Chervonenko, Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary, 23 August 2019
Church of God (Cleveland) official, 4 and 31 December 2019
Gennadi Pshenichny, Kuban Evangelical Christian University, 1 November 2019
Russian denominational leader, 25 October 2019
Walter Sawatsky, Anabaptist Mennonite Biblical Seminary, 14 March 2020
“Ivan Smirnov,” 9 and 12 January 2020
Aleksandr Spichak, Trinity Video Seminary, 11 December 2019
William Yoder, Russian Evangelical Alliance, 14 March 2020
Olga Zaprometova, St. Filaret Orthodox Christian Institute, 9 October 2019
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